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Avian-origin	 influenza	 A(H7N9)	 recently	 emerged	 in	
China,	 causing	 severe	 human	 disease.	 Several	 subtype	
H7N9	isolates	contain	influenza	genes	previously	identified	
in	viruses	from	finch-like	birds.	Because	wild	and	domestic	
songbirds interact with humans and poultry, we investigat-
ed	 the	 susceptibility	 and	 transmissibility	 of	 subtype	H7N9	
in these species. Finches, sparrows, and parakeets sup-
ported	replication	of	a	human	subtype	H7N9	isolate,	shed	
high titers through the oropharyngeal route, and showed 
few	disease	signs.	Virus	was	shed	into	water	troughs,	and	
several contact animals seroconverted, although they shed 
little virus. Our study demonstrates that a human isolate can 
replicate in and be shed by such songbirds and parakeets 
into	 their	 environment.	 This	 finding	 has	 implications	 for	
these birds’ potential as intermediate hosts with the ability to 
facilitate	transmission	and	dissemination	of	A(H7N9)	virus.
The emergence of novel influenza strains from the avian reservoir remains a constant threat to human and ani-
mal health, as was recently illustrated by human infections 
with novel and wholly avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses in 
China. These viruses show little virulence in birds but can 
cause severe illness in humans (1,2). Of the 134 confirmed 
human cases reported as of August 2013, >30% were fatal 
(3,4). In the 3 index case-patients, the illness progressed 
to acute respiratory distress syndrome and death (1), and 
most persons with confirmed infections required hospital 
care (2,5). Retrospective epidemiologic analyses showed 
>75% of affected patients had had contact with domestic 
poultry (6,7), a common source of zoonotic transmission 
of influenza (8). Several of the A(H7N9) virus internal 
genes (polymerase basic protein [PB] 1, matrix, nonstruc-
tural protein, and nucleoprotein) originated from the H9N2 
subtype commonly found in chickens. When chickens and 
quail were inoculated with A(H7N9) isolated from humans, 
they shed the viruses to high titers but had little or no clini-
cal disease (9,10). Thus, poultry appears to be a reservoir 
for A(H7N9) viruses and a source of human infections. Yet, 
multiple lines of evidence suggest avian species other than 
the usual suspects (waterfowl and poultry) contributed to 
the emergence of these novel H7N9 viruses: first, H7N9 has 
been isolated from nonpoultry birds (pigeons) in Chinese 
live-bird markets (11); second, 2 genes (PA, PB2) in an ini-
tially characterized human isolate (A/Anhui/1/2013) were 
most closely related to viruses isolated from bramblings 
(finch-like birds of the large order Passeriformes) (12); and 
third, the matrix, polymerase acidic protein [PA], PB1 and 
PB2 gene segments from additional human isolates appear 
to have been donated by A/brambling/Beijing/16/2012 
(H9N2)-like virus(es) (13). Therefore, songbirds and other 
small, terrestrial birds could have been directly involved 
in the genesis of novel A(H7N9) viruses and subsequent 
infection in humans.
Songbirds are common household pets and are in close 
contact with humans and domesticated animals. Their 
wild counterparts also are likely to interact with poultry in 
backyard farms and in many farming sectors (14,15). Con-
sequently, we examined the replication and transmission 
of the human isolate A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) in wild and 
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domesticated small birds. A/Anhui/1/2013 was isolated 
from one of the initially reported human case-patients (1) 
and is closely related to many of the avian isolates that 
have been recovered (12). For this study, we chose 3 spe-
cies of Passeriformes (zebra finches, society finches, and 
sparrows), which are related to the bramblings described 
previously. We also studied the parakeet (budgerigar; or-
der Psittaciformes), a bird found in the wild and in house-
holds as a pet, that is known to support the replication of 
other subtypes of influenza (16–18). The study was con-
ducted during June and July 2013 at St. Jude Children’s 
Research Hospital (Memphis, TN, USA).
Methods
Virus and Facilities
A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9), A/Vietnam/1203/04 
(H5N1), and A/songbird/Hong Kong/SB102/2001 (H3N8) 
viruses were propagated and titrated in chicken eggs as de-
scribed (15,19,20). Pooled allantoic fluid was used for each 
study. A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) used in these experiments 
was passaged 3 times in eggs from the original patient sam-
ple, and the sequence of the virus inoculum corresponded 
to Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data acces-
sion no. EPI_ISL_138739. Experiments were performed 
under Biosafety Level 3+ containment in accord with 
the federal regulations (US Department of Agriculture 9 
CFR 121 and 7 CFR 331, www.aphis.usda.gov/programs/
ag_selectagent/downloads/FinalRule3-18-05.pdf).
Animals
Commercially acquired zebra finches (Taeniopygia 
guttata), society finches (Lonchura striata domestica) 
and parakeets (Melopsittacus undulates) and wild-caught 
house sparrows (Passer domesticus), were quarantined for 
1–3 weeks and displayed no signs of disease before the ex-
periment. We serologically tested 3 or 4 sentinel birds of 
each species (excluding sparrows because of limited avail-
ability) for influenza antibodies (H3, H5, H7) by hemag-
glutination inhibition (HI) assay and found them to be an-
tibody negative. Swabs taken on day 0 were negative for 
virus isolation in eggs. Food was provided ad libitum, and 
a minimum of 0.25 L of water was provided daily with a 
full change of water every 48 h. All birds within a given 
group shared the same water and food troughs. Groups of 
birds were inoculated intranasally, intraocularly, and orally 
with 105 log10 50% egg infectious dose (EID50) of pooled 
allantoic fluid containing A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) in 100 
μL of phosphate-buffered saline. The inoculated animals 
were co-housed with 2 (parakeets) or 3 (finches, sparrows) 
naïve, direct-contact birds. Each bird’s oropharynx and clo-
aca were swabbed every second day for 10 days. For each 
sample, virus was isolated and titrated in eggs in triplicate 
(3 eggs/sample, 100 μL each of 6 serial log10 dilutions) as 
described (15,20). All animal experiments were approved 
by the St. Jude Animal Care and Use Committee and com-
plied with all applicable US regulations.
Necropsy
At 3 days post inoculation (dpi), 2 finches from each 
group and 1 sparrow were euthanized for necropsy. Para-
keets were excluded from euthanasia and subsequent nec-
ropsy because of limited numbers. To prevent cross-con-
tamination, organs were harvested in the following order, 
and instruments were cleaned after each organ was sam-
pled: brain, eye, lung, trachea, small intestine, and large in-
testine. Tissues were homogenized, and virus was isolated 
and titrated in eggs as described (15,20). Birds that were 
found dead underwent similar necropsy, but only brain, 
lung, and combined (small and large) intestinal tissue were 
collected (15,19,20).
Serology
At 16 dpi, serum was collected from all surviving 
animals and tested by HI assay with homologous (A/An-
hui/1/2013, H7N9) and heterologous (A/songbird/Hong 
Kong/SB102/2001, H3N8; A/Vietnam/1203/04, H5N1) vi-
ruses by using horse erythrocytes as described (21). An HI 
titer >20 was considered indicative of recent infection with 
A(H7N9) virus, whereas titers <20 were considered negative.
Statistical Analysis
Mean infectious titers and serum antibody titers were 
compared using the 1-tailed Student t test in Excel (Micro-
soft, Redmond, WA) or GraphPad Prism v5 (La Jolla, CA, 
USA) software.
Results
Replication and Pathogenicity of A(H7N9) Virus
All inoculated birds shed virus, but shedding was con-
fined to the oropharynx; no virus was isolated at any time 
from the cloaca. Shedding was highest in the 2 finch spe-
cies at 2 dpi, and virus titers shed by these birds were 1.5–
1.9 log10 higher than those from the sparrows or parakeets 
(p<0.001). Subsequently, society finches showed higher 
shedding than sparrows at 4 dpi (p<0.001), but the remain-
ing groups did not differ in levels of virus shedding. Virus 
was shed for 6 days by finches and parakeets and for 4 days 
by sparrows, and >80% of the zebra finches and parakeets 
continued to shed virus at 6 dpi (Table 1). Virus had cleared 
in all inoculated animals by 8 dpi. One sparrow and 1 zebra 
finch were found dead at 3 and 6 dpi, respectively (Table 
1), but only the sparrow had shown clinical signs of disease 
(lethargy; loose, discolored feces; ruffled feathers). Surviv-
ing inoculated birds were free of disease signs, although a 
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slight decrease in food consumption and emptying of food 
troughs was observed at 6–9 dpi among zebra finches. In 
conclusion, all 4 species of small birds tested were suscep-
tible to infection with A/Anhui/1/2013.
Shedding of Virus into Water
Each day for 6 days, water was sampled from the com-
munal trough shared by birds within each cage group, and 
virus was titrated in eggs. Virus was detected in all water 
troughs and on multiple days (Figure). Both finch species 
shed virus into the water on every postinoculation day stud-
ied, with the exception of 3 dpi in the zebra finches. Virus 
was not shed into the water until 3 dpi by the sparrows and 
parakeets. Zebra finches tended to shed more virus into 
the water than did sparrows or parakeets, and mean titers 
across of all sampled times differed significantly between 
these groups (p<0.05). However, the possibility that bird 
groups consumed different levels of water on any given day 
could not be normalized.
Shedding by Direct Contacts
In the songbirds and parakeets, A/Anhui/1/13 virus 
was not highly transmissible to direct-contact animals. A 
single contact zebra finch showed trace amounts of virus 
at 2 and 4 dpi, and 2 sparrows showed trace amounts of 
virus at 4 dpi. Contact parakeets remained virus negative. 
In contrast, 1 contact society finch shed high titers of virus 
from 2 dpi (105.8 log10 EID50/mL) through 8 dpi (Table 2). 
As with the inoculated animals, direct contacts shed virus 
only by the oropharyngeal route.
Isolation of Virus from Organs
Organs from inoculated birds were recovered 3 dpi, 
and virus was isolated and titered in chicken eggs. The 
sparrow that underwent necropsy showed trace virus only 
in the lungs (Table 3). Both finch species showed high vi-
rus titers in the trachea (4.5–4.6 log10 EID50/mL). In the ze-
bra finches, virus was observed only in the tracheas, consis-
tent with swab findings, but 1 of 2 society finches showed 
trace amounts of virus in the brain and eye, whereas the 
other had trace amounts in the small and large intestine and 
high lung virus titer (5.8 log10 EID50/mL) (Table 3). Two 
donor birds (one sparrow and one zebra finch) died during 
the experiment and underwent necropsy. No virus was iso-
lated in any of the sparrow’s organs. However, in the zebra 
finch, virus was detected in brain, lung, and intestine (2.5, 
5.5, and 2.5 log10 EID50/mL, respectively), suggesting that 
finches are vulnerable to extrapulmonary A(H7N9) virus 
infection (Table 3).
Rates of Seroconversion
All surviving birds were tested for seroconversion by 
HI assay with serum collected at 16 dpi (Table 4). Among 
inoculated birds, 100% of society finches and sparrows 
seroconverted to homologous virus, as did 75% of zebra 
finches and 80% of parakeets. Mean HI titers in inocu-
lated birds ranged from 4.8 to 6.9 log2 (HI 30–140) (Table 
4). All contact zebra finches seroconverted, but only 1 
of 3 society finches and 2 of 3 sparrows seroconverted. 
No seroconversion of contact parakeets was observed. 
Mean HI titers in contact animals that seroconverted were 
4.3–6.3 log2 (HI 20–80). Mean titers were highest in so-
ciety finches and lowest in parakeets, although they did 
not differ significantly in inoculated versus contact groups 
or according to species. HI titers to heterologous human 





Titer from oropharyngeal swab† 
No. deaths‡ 2	dpi 4	dpi 6 dpi 8	dpi 
Zebra	finch 4.8	 0.5	(7/7) 3.8	 1.3	(5/5) 2.9	 1.0	(5/5)§ < 1/5 
Society finch 4.9	 0.5	(7/7) 3.9	 0.7	(5/5) 1.0	 0.0	(1/5) < 0/5 
Sparrow 3.0	 0.5	(6/6) 3.0	 0.7	(3/4) < < 1/5 
Parakeet 3.4	 0.5	(5/5) 3.9	 1.6	(4/5) 2.6	 0.1	(4/5) < 0/5 
*dpi,	days	post	inoculation;	<,	below	the	limit	of	detection	(<0.75	EID50/mL);	EID50,	50%	egg	infectious	dose. 
†Log10 EID50/mL.	Data	are	the	mean	 SD	of	positive	samples	(no.	birds	shedding	virus/total	no.	sampled	at	the	indicated	time	point). All cloacal samples 
were below the limit of detection at all time points. 




was collected daily for 6 days, and virus was titrated in chicken 




We assessed parakeets and 3 species of songbirds 
for their susceptibility to avian-origin A(H7N9) (A/An-
hui/1/2013) virus and found that they were highly suscep-
tible to infection with this isolate. Shedding was limited to 
the oropharynx, which may have reduced contact transmis-
sion; however, at most times sampled, the water troughs 
contained large amounts of virus. Furthermore, low-patho-
genicity influenza viruses (those lacking a multibasic cleav-
age site in the hemagglutinin protein), such as the A(H7N9) 
isolate used here, remain stable in water longer than their 
highly pathogenic counterparts (22) and could therefore 
serve as an inoculum for cage mates. Despite little shedding 
in the contacts, seroconversion of at least 1 contact animal 
in each of the finch and sparrow groups indicates exposure 
with antigenic epitopes of the subtype H7 hemagglutinin. 
The minimal transmission to direct contacts observed in 
our study is consistent with previous observations of avian 
influenza virus infection of songbirds (15,20,23–25). The 
parakeets in particular showed no contact animal shed-
ding or seroconversion, a phenomenon we have previously 
observed with an A(H3N8) isolate from a songbird (R.G. 
Webster et al., unpub. data). This observation may have im-
plications for risk assessment of this species in the pet bird 
trade; however, the lack of proper influenza transmission 
data with this species in the literature warrants additional 
studies to confirm the validity of this observation. One di-
rect-contact society finch shed virus equivalent to titers in 
inoculated birds and shed for a longer period, which sug-
gests that efficient transmission and replication in contact 
animals, although rare, is possible. The ability of these 
small birds to harbor and shed A(H7N9) viruses, usually 
with few signs of illness, creates a substantial potential for 
transmission to humans, as well as to poultry and wild birds.
Interspecies transmission has not yet been investi-
gated, and the extent to which A(H7N9)-infected finches, 
sparrows, and parakeets may transmit virus to other spe-
cies, including through shared water sources, is unknown. 
Two host groups have the greatest potential interaction 
with small birds. The first is domesticated poultry, pri-
marily chickens but also a wide variety of gallinaceous 
and game birds. The peridomestic nature of songbirds fa-
cilitates an interaction with poultry in large production fa-
cilities and in backyard farms (14,15). In these cases, they 
may share common food and water sources (15). The inter-
species transmission of influenza from songbirds to poul-
try is not without precedent. Nestorowicz et al. proposed 
that highly virulent A(H7N7) isolates from starlings and 
chickens were closely related and indicated that the virus 
had been transmitted between these 2 species (23). Forrest 
et al. experimentally demonstrated waterborne transmis-
sion of highly pathogenic A(H5N1) virus from chickens 
to starlings (15), although the high death rate of the inocu-
lated birds might have limited the degree of interspecies 
transmission. In the case of the low-virulence A(H7N9) 
viruses, most inoculated birds shed virus while remain-
ing clinically healthy. The absence of illness and death 
in A(H7N9)-infected birds has implications for a greater 
quantity and duration of virus shedding into the environ-
ment, as well as higher activity levels and likelihood of 
interaction with other susceptible hosts. Preliminary data 
suggest that chickens and quail are highly susceptible to 
infection with this human A(H7N9) isolate and that the 
virus is readily transmitted by direct contact (9,10). The 
high titers recovered from the shared water troughs of all 
species tested in our study suggest that the virus could be 
transmitted to poultry and other birds through this route. 
Therefore, reduced interaction of domestic poultry with 
wild passerine birds is advisable, although this precaution 
might not be feasible in developing countries where nu-
merous backyard farms lack biosecurity. Comprehensive 




Titer from oropharyngeal swab† 
2	dpi 4	dpi 6 dpi 8	dpi 
Zebra	finch 1.0	 0.0 (1/3)‡ 1.0	 0.0 (1/3) ‡ < < 
Society finch 5.8	 0.0	(1/3) 3.5	 0.0	(1/3) 2.3	 0.0	(1/3) 2.8	 0.0	(1/3) 
Sparrow < 1.9	 1.2	(2/3) < < 
Parakeet < < < < 
*dpi,	days	post	inoculation;	<,	below	the	limit	of	detection	(<0.75	EID50/mL);	EID50,	50%	egg	infectious	dose. 
†Log10 EID50/mL.	Data	are	the	mean	 SD	of	positive	samples	(no.	birds	shedding/total	no.	sampled	at	the	indicated	time	point). All cloacal samples were 
below the limit of detection at all time points. 





Brain Eye Trachea Lung Small intestine Large	Intestine 
Zebra	finch < < 4.5	±	0.0	(2/2) < < < 
Society finch 2.5	 0.0	(1/2) 1.0	 0.0	(1/2) 4.6	 2.7	(2/2) 5.8	 0.0	(1/2) 1.0	 0.0 (1/2)‡ 2.5	 0.0	(1/2) 
Sparrow < < < 1.0 ± 0.0 (1/1)‡ < < 
*<,	below	the	limit	of	detection	(<0.75	EID50/mL); EID50,	50%	egg	infectious	dose. 
†Log10 EID50/mL.	Data	are	the	mean	 SD	of	positive	(>0.75	EID50/mL)	samples (no.	birds	shedding/total	no.	sampled	at	the	indicated	time	point). 
‡Sample contained trace amount of virus: 1 or 2 of 3 inoculated eggs was positive at the lowest serial dilution. 
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industrialized and developing countries and should be en-
hanced to limit the access of wild songbirds to the poul-
try’s water and food sources.
A second host group with high potential to interact 
with songbirds and other small terrestrial birds are humans. 
Finches, sparrows, and parakeets are not only common in 
the wild but are popular pets worldwide (26). They are of-
ten sold in the live-bird markets of eastern Asia, where the 
risk for zoonotic influenza transmission of H7N9 and other 
influenza subtypes is already established (26,27). Such pet 
birds may be procured from the wild and may have been 
exposed to a variety of pathogens before entering the mar-
ket chain (9). In China, the keeping of pet birds is associat-
ed with luck (28) and is common among elderly men, who 
often stroll through the parks with their caged birds (28,29). 
In caring for such pets, their owners could become infected 
by virus contaminated drinking water or from fomites on 
the feathers (deposited while bathing in water troughs or 
from saliva while preening) (30). This same demographic 
group (elderly men) experienced disproportionate rates of 
illness and death from A(H7N9) infection in China (31). 
A recent epidemiologic study by Rivers et al. concluded 
that the comparatively higher rates of infection among the 
elderly than among younger age groups cannot be entirely 
attributed to increased exposure to poultry. Furthermore, 
they assert that an “as-yet unknown epidemiological or im-
munological feature” may explain the high infection rates 
among older persons (27), which leaves open the contri-
bution of alternate exposure sources, such as infected pet 
birds, as a possibility. Virus also could be transmitted to 
humans through religious ceremonies, such as the Buddhist 
practice of “merit release,” in which a songbird is pur-
chased, held to the face, kissed, and released (25). Simply 
owning a pet bird increased a household’s rate of serocon-
version during the 2003 A(H7N7) outbreak in the Neth-
erlands (32). Although completely avoiding contact with 
pet birds during an avian influenza outbreak might not be 
feasible, surveillance of such species in the markets, and 
perhaps in the wild, would help to identify or rule out previ-
ously unsuspected hosts that might support or disseminate 
emerging viruses.
To expand on our findings, future studies should in-
clude the examination of genetic changes in the human 
A(H7N9) virus during replication and transmission in the 
songbirds and parakeets. The human isolate we used con-
tained genetic markers (HA: S138A, G186V, and Q226L; 
PB2: E627K) indicating adaptation to mammals (33). Se-
quence analysis of virus shed by the small birds in our 
study might indicate which species would be most recep-
tive to transmission. The loss of the markers of mammalian 
adaptation and reversion to an avian-like genotype might 
predispose the virus to transmission from the small birds 
to poultry and other birds, rather than to humans. Addi-
tionally, studies that assess the sharing of housing, water, 
and food by inoculated songbirds and poultry (particularly 
chickens or quail) would shed light on the interspecies 
transmission potential of A(H7N9) viruses.
Our demonstratration that parakeets and multiple 
species of songbirds are susceptible to influenza A(H7N9) 
virus isolated from humans during the recent outbreak in 
China further supports the possible contribution of song-
birds and parakeets to the ecology, maintenance, and 
transmission of novel A(H7N9) viruses. Finally, they 
lead us to propose that finches, sparrows, and parakeets 
may be intermediate hosts and sources of A(H7N9) vi-
ruses and that their frequent interaction with wild birds, 
domestic poultry, and humans renders them a particular 
risk factor in the emergence and transmission of novel in-
fluenza strains.
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Zebra	finch    
 Inoculated < 5.3	±	1.0	(3/4) < 
 Contact < 4.3	±	0.0	(3/3) < 
Society finch    
 Inoculated < 6.9	±	0.9	(5/5) < 
 Contact < 6.3	±	0.0	(1/3) < 
Sparrow    
 Inoculated ND 5.8	±	0.6	(4/4) < 
 Contact ND 4.3	±	0.0	(2/3) < 
Parakeet    
 Inoculated < 4.8	±	0.6	(4/5) < 





number of available birds; HA, hemagglutinin. 
†Reciprocal value (log2/50	μL)	of	the	highest	titer	that	inhibited	4	HA	units	
of	virus	(no.	seropositive	animals/total	no.	sampled).	Data	are	the	mean	±	
SD of positive samples. 
‡Baseline HI titers (3 birds/group) were obtained before virus challenge. 
§HI titers to heterologous viruses	were	determined	in	the	serum	(16	dpi)	




interests include the host response to influenza viruses, emergence 
of novel influenza variants, and zoonotic transmission of influ-
enza between species.
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